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THE INNOCENT VILLAIN: INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 
BY TEXT
Charles Adside III*
Michelle Carter’s texts instructing her mentally ill online boyfriend to commit 
suicide offended the social moral code. But the law does not categorize all morally 
reprehensible behavior as criminal. Commonwealth v. Carter is unprecedented 
in manslaughter law because Carter was convicted on the theory that she was 
virtually present as opposed to physically present—at the crime scene. The court’s
reasoning is expansive, as the framework it employs is excessively vague and does 
not provide fair notice to the public of which actions constitute involuntary 
manslaughter. Disturbingly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed 
the trial court’s logic. This Article concludes that a conviction based upon a 
virtual-presence theory is unconstitutional, as it is void-for-vagueness. 
Hypotheticals are provided to illustrate how the Carter framework is unworkable 
when applied to online relationships based on electronic communications. State 
legislatures, not courts, should regulate this area, providing clear rules on when 
electronic encouragement of suicide violates the law. States can consider a 
physical-presence requirement and prohibit prosecutions on this basis. Or, 
legislators can borrow from aiding and abetting principles to expand their special 
relationship statutes to include online relationships, creating a duty to report 
when encouraging another to commit suicide. In either case, the law will provide 
citizens with bright-line rules to forecast when electronic conduct is subject to 
criminal sanction.
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INTRODUCTION
Not all villains are criminals. All morally reprehensible behavior 
cannot be subject to criminal sanction. If it was, the courts would 
be busy indeed; dockets would swell with cases in which defendants 
are charged under laws that cover unknown areas of life. The 
Founding Fathers warned about the adverse effects of a cumber-
some legal code. As James Madison explained in Federalist Paper No. 
62: “It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by 
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men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they 
cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood.”1
Many scholars argue, though, that American society has already 
become over-criminalized with 4,500 federal statutes enforced by 
300,000 administrative regulations that carry criminal penalties.2
One scholar observed that over-criminalization
lessens the value of . . . important legislation when you 
flood the landscape with so many pieces of legislation. It 
makes it unwieldy, impossible for the lay person to under-
stand what is criminal and what is not, and it grows the 
power of prosecutors—who can then pick and choose the 
crime of their choice.3
This is an alarming prospect considering that 2.3 million people 
are now incarcerated in the United States.4 Vague laws establish no 
limits on the state’s regulatory powers. A few thought experiments 
can better illustrate the point.
For a moment, imagine a world of legislative vagueness, where 
broad statutes criminalize a wide range of criminal conduct, but 
leave unresolved which specific acts are criminal.5 Say Congress 
enacted an anti-dishonesty statute that requires “all persons be 
honest and trustworthy at all times.”6 An adulterer or tax-evader 
could fall under the anti-dishonesty statute, but what about a par-
ent who tells their child that the Tooth Fairy or Santa Claus exists? 
Is this, too, a punishable “dishonest” offense? Such a law, as writ-
ten, cannot be enforced consistently; it fails to notify the public 
about the exact conduct that is considered criminally dishonest 
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison).
2. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, You Are Probably Breaking the Law Now, USA TODAY, (Mar. 
29, 2015, 4:14 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/29/crime-law-
criminal-unfair-column/70630978/.
3. Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a Growing Problem, 102 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 530 (2012). See generally Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminal-
ization, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17 (1968) (explaining the social costs of overcriminalization); Ekow 
N. Yankah, A Paradox in Overcriminalization, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing that 
criminalizing marijuana empowered police to search, detain, and arrest citizens in racially 
discriminatory ways).
4. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html.
5. Cf. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 
1239–40 (1994) (arguing that the federal statutes delegate authority to the executive branch 
through vague laws that create what he refers to as “little Goodness and Niceness Commis-
sions” that are charged to enforce those statutes).
6. The anti-dishonesty statute raises the same problems that Lawson raised with 
Goodness and Niceness laws. See generally id.
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and untrustworthy.7 As another example, legislators would run into 
the same vagueness issues if they codified the privacy doctrine es-
tablished in Griswold v. Connecticut.8 Suppose a state legislature 
passed a law that ensures that “each citizen within this jurisdiction 
shall be entitled to a right to privacy.” Although everyone wants 
privacy, this statute is unenforceable as well because citizens are 
not told which activities the law protects from government inter-
ference.9 Can a person smoke marijuana in their basement while 
listening to Cardi B?10 Can a businesswoman email her spouse in-
sider information from her office?11 Under the statute, the answer 
to these questions is: Who knows? Whether a state would consider 
such absurd laws is not the point. Rather, the statutory language
opens a new frontier for criminal liability and leaves it to the sub-
jective judgment of a prosecutor or judge to decide whether to 
punish the parent like the tax evader or the marijuana user like an 
insider trader. The Constitution forbids such unfettered govern-
ment discretion.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments demand that the government cannot deprive any person of 
their liberty without “fair notice” of which behaviors are criminal.12
The principle is a bulwark against unchecked prosecutorial discre-
tion. Courts invalidate laws that violate this principle on the basis 
that they are void-for-vagueness.13 Michelle Carter’s conviction in 
Commonwealth v. Carter presents a vagueness issue in the context of 
online relationships based on electronic communications because 
7. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 96 (1990) (suggesting that an anti-
sodomy law that proscribes “unnatural practices” might be invalidated on vagueness 
grounds for not providing fair notice).
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (announcing a penumbral right to privacy in the Constitu-
tion).
9. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 750–51 (1989) (“What, 
then, is the right to privacy? What does it protect? To be sure, the privacy doctrine involves 
the ‘right to make choices and decisions,’ which, it is said, forms the ‘kernel’ of autonomy. 
The question, however, is which choices and decisions are protected?”).
10. See BORK, supra note 7, at 99. (“[Griswold] said there was now a right of privacy but 
did not even intimate an answer to the question, ‘Privacy to do what?’ People often take ad-
dictive drugs in private . . . .”).
11. See id. (“[E]xecutives conspire to fix prices in private . . . .”).
12. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015); see, e.g., City of Akron v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (finding an abortion ordinance too 
vague to be upheld); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (finding a law that required 
“loiterers” and “wanderers” to provide identification upon police demand void-for-
vagueness); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (finding a vagrancy law 
void-for-vagueness); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (holding uncon-
stitutionally void-for-vagueness a statute requiring businesses to pay workers not less than the 
“current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed”).
13. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (applying Johnson to hold 
that the definition of “crime of violence” as set forth in the Armed Career Criminal Act and 
incorporated in the Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutionally vague).
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her conviction is based on a novel theory that she was virtually, not 
physically, present at the crime scene. It is a theory with no com-
mon understanding that may make many unsuspecting citizens in-
to criminals. Carter is one such person.
Carter texted suicide methods to her online boyfriend Conrad 
Roy as he considered taking his life.14 They met in 2012 while visit-
ing relatives in Florida.15 Carter and Roy then developed a roman-
tic relationship but “the majority of their contact took place 
through the exchange of voluminous text messages.”16 They only 
met a few times. Knowing that Roy suffered from depression, 
Carter attempted to convince him to seek help; she began to en-
courage suicide in earnest, however, when Roy unequivocally stat-
ed that he wanted to die.17 She did her homework on this morbid 
question and texted:
Plastic bag over your head is only a 23% chance of dying. 
And the overdose on pills and drugs can take up to 2 hours 
so idk if that’s worth it. You want something quick. Gun-
shots to the head is a 99% chance of working, hanging is an 
89% chance of working, carbon monoxide is a 80% chance 
of working. And pills hardly ever work. Carbon monoxide 
poisoning is the best option . . . if you fall asleep in your car 
while it’s running in a garage, it will kill you. Takes up to 15 
mins. And there’s no pain.18
Roy eventually took his life through carbon monoxide poisoning.19
A Massachusetts grand jury indicted Carter for involuntary man-
slaughter on February 6, 2015.20 Carter’s attorneys filed a motion to 
14. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1058 (Mass. 2016); see also Carter, 52 
N.E.3d at 1057–58 n.4.
15. Carla M. Zavala, Comment, Manslaughter by Text: Is Encouraging Suicide Manslaugh-
ter?, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 297, 300 (2016).
16. Carter, 52 N.E.3d at 1057; see also All the Texts Between Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy 
the Day He Died, BOSTON 25 NEWS (last updated Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.fox25boston.com/news/all-the-text-messages-between-michelle-carter-and-
conrad-roy-they-day-he-died/532942907 (follow “You can read all the messages presented as 
evidence here” link) [hereinafter Texts]. This source lists thousands of text messages be-
tween Carter and Roy that were entered into evidence during the criminal proceedings 
against Carter. For the sake of organization, references to the text messages within this arti-
cle refer to them by their numbered placement in the spreadsheet in chronological order. 
The texts have been marked to read as dialogue and only edited where necessary to aid 
comprehension.
17. See Texts, supra note 16, nos. 280–82. (Carter sending Roy electronic links on how 
to obtain help for anxiety); id. nos. 1356, 1358 (Roy telling Carter, “No. you don’t under-
stand . . . I WANT TO DIE.”); id. nos. 1360–1405 (back-and-forth between the two, with 
Carter encouraging Roy to commit suicide).
18. Texts, supra note 16, no. 2348.
19. Carter, 52 N.E.3d at 1063.
20. Id. at 1056.
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dismiss, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to present suffi-
cient evidence of involuntary manslaughter.21 On immediate ap-
peal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the 
Juvenile Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.22 After waiving her 
right to a trial by jury, the trial court convicted Carter of involun-
tary manslaughter.23 The fact that Carter was not physically present 
at the suicide scene mattered not: “[The circumstances of the sui-
cide] included the defendant’s virtual presence at the time of the su-
icide, the previous constant pressure the defendant had put on the 
victim, and his already delicate mental state.”24 In early March of 
2018, Carter’s attorneys appealed the conviction.25
The SJC recently made its decision and upheld her conviction. It 
rejected, among other things, Carter’s vagueness claim.26 In doing 
so, the court declared that the principle that a defendant can be 
convicted for simply advising, without physical presence, a person 
to commit suicide is “found in centuries-old Massachusetts com-
mon law.”27 That state’s common law may be centuries old, but the 
principle that a defendant’s words without physical presence can 
justify an involuntary manslaughter conviction is not.28 It is of re-
cent vintage. In fact, all of the cases on which Carter II relied in-
cluded defendants that were physically present.29 The SCJ even 
heralded an 1816 decision, Commonwealth v. Bowen, that ruled that 
advising another to commit suicide constituted murder.30 Bowen
does not support Carter at all. The state accused Bowen of urging a 
fellow inmate to kill himself in order to avoid a public execution; 
the two prisoners had neighboring cells, enabling them to talk to 
one another. In other words, the state’s theory could not work 
without Bowen’s physical proximity to the other inmate.31
21. Id.
22. See id. at 1054.
23. Denise Lavoie, Michelle Carter Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter in Texting Suicide 
Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, https://www.wbur.org/news/2017/06/16/michelle-carter-guilty 
(last updated June 16, 2017, 6:55 PM).
24. Carter, 52 N.E.3d at 1054 (emphasis added).
25. See Travis Anderson, Mass. High Court to Take Up Michelle Carter’s Appeal in Suicide 
Texting Case, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/
03/15/sjc-will-hear-michelle-carter-appeal/59qvrwKFrWE44PYPj6iZmN/story.html.
26. Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter II), 481 Mass. 352, 363–64 (2019).
27. Id. at 365.
28. Id. at 363–64 (“The defendant argues that she lacked fair notice that she could be 
convicted of involuntary manslaughter for her role in the victim’s suicide and that her con-
viction therefore violated her right to due process. That is, she argues that the law of invol-
untary manslaughter is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her conduct. We rejected this 
argument in Carter I, and we remain of the view that the law is not vague.”).
29. See id. at 364–67.
30. Id. at 365 (citing Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 356 (1816)).
31. Bowen, 13 Mass. at 356.
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Even though Carter has been tried in the court system, Carter’s
innocence has been scrutinized in the “Court of Public Opinion.”
Many people might be outraged to learn that “when Roy began to 
feel the effects of the carbon monoxide poisoning and stepped out 
of his [truck], Carter was the one who instructed him . . . to ‘get 
back in.’”32 In this respect, the public views Carter’s conduct as no 
different than a police officer called upon to talk down a man
threatening to jump from a ledge. And instead of persuading him 
from jumping, he tells the suicidal man: “Sir, stop wasting our 
time. If you are going to jump, then do it already.”33 Like the police 
officer’s callous remarks, Carter did not talk Roy down, but her 
words effectively told him to jump off the ledge.
While Carter’s conduct runs contrary to our standards on com-
mon decency, her conviction is based on unconstitutional reason-
ing. This Article illustrates that a prosecution based on a defend-
ant’s “virtual presence” at a suicide is similar to the state charging a 
parent for telling his child that the Tooth Fairy exists under an an-
ti-honesty statute or a judge deciding that recreational drug use is 
not protected under a “right to privacy.” Undefined legal terms 
like these provide no warning and thus permit arbitrary law en-
forcement.
However, the SJC presumed that the trial judge correctly applied 
the law because his finding of causation “in this [virtual] con-
text . . . is supported by temporal distinctions” showing that Carter 
“overpowered the victim’s will and thus caused his death.”34 Since 
the SCJ affirmed the trial court’s reasoning, this Article focuses on 
the trial court’s decision. It shows that the virtual-presence theory 
is undefinable and that it deprived Carter of any fair notice that 
she committed involuntary manslaughter. Carter attempted to de-
fine virtual presence; to the contrary, a closer read finds that the 
court apparently developed, or at least inferred, a test for deter-
mining when virtual presence in a suicide encouragement case be-
comes a crime.35 The test raises more questions than answers, as 
the factors Carter employed to define virtual presence offer no 
concrete meaning to the term. In fact, the factors add to the un-
predictability of the concept when applied to similar cases.
32. Issie Lapowsky, The Texting Suicide Case is About Crime, Not Tech, WIRED (June 6, 
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/texting-suicide-crime/.
33. Cf. Danya Bazaraa & Joseph Wilkes, Callous Motorists Abuse Man “Threatening to Jump” 
from Bridge over M5 and Demand Police “Drag Him Off”, BRISTOLLIVE (Dec. 9, 2017), 
https://www.bristolpost.co.uk/news/local-news/callous-motorists-abuse-man-threatening-
901839 (describing an incident in the United Kingdom in which citizens turned to Twitter 
to mock a man who had threatened to jump from a bridge for holding up traffic).
34. Carter II, 481 Mass. at 362–63.
35. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1065 n.13 (Mass. 2016).
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Carter’s logic could potentially influence other courts to follow 
suit. Many social connections are now forged virtually on electron-
ic forums such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Kik, Skype, or 
Facetime, and a host of phone applications. According to the Pew 
Research Center, “[t]he share of 18- to 24-year-olds who use online 
dating has roughly tripled from 10% in 2013 to 27% today.”36 The 
idea that online activity can lead to suicide is not far-fetched. 
Online dating or chatting might be the new forum for people to 
freely express their suicidal thoughts. This may have profound le-
gal consequences.
Prosecutors in other cases have expressed a similar intent to 
prosecute suicide encouragers who were not physically present 
when the victim committed suicide. In Minnesota, for example, the 
state prosecuted William Melchert-Dinkel under its anti-suicide en-
couragement statute.37 In this case, the defendant posed as a de-
pressed female nurse on suicide websites, instructing individuals 
on how to hang themselves while he watched via webcam.38 Falsely 
claiming that he would commit suicide too, he lured five people to 
enter suicide pacts with him, two of whom killed themselves.39
In 2006, a Missouri woman, Lori Drew, faced federal charges re-
lating to online suicide encouragement.40 Drew presented herself 
as a sixteen-year-old boy named “Josh Evans” on MySpace. She 
then used the account to flirt with a thirteen-year-old girl. Drew 
had “Josh” tell the girl that he no longer liked her and that “the 
world would be a better place without her in it.”41 The girl commit-
ted suicide that day.42 The federal government charged Drew un-
der the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) for posting a pho-
tograph of a boy without his consent in violation of MySpace’s
terms of service.43
Neither of these cases provide clear models for prosecutors to 
follow. In Melchert-Dinkel, the Minnesota Supreme Court subse-
quently struck down portions of the Suicide Encouragement Law 
on First Amendment grounds.44 In United States v. Drew, the district 
36. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, 5 Facts About Online Dating, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/29/5-facts-about-online-
dating/.
37. See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Minn. 2014).
38. Id. at 16; see also Former Nurse Helped Instruct Man on How to Commit Suicide, Court 
Rules, GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2015, 2:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/dec/28/minnesota-suicide-conviction-william-melchert-dinkel-mark-drybrough
(describing the circumstances of Melchert-Dinkel’s conviction).
39. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 17.
40. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
41. Id. at 452.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 452, 461.
44. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 16.
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court held that the CFAA would not be applicable in every situa-
tion and is certainly not a solution to bring clarity to the law; in 
fact, a federal judge overturned Drew’s conviction, finding that the 
statute was void-for-vagueness as applied to the case.45 Both cases
illustrate the need for clear rules on suicide encouragement. New 
proposals are needed in this emerging area, particularly when the 
suicide rate in the United States has “surged to the highest levels in 
nearly 30 years . . . with increases in every age group except older 
adults.”46
These cases show that electronic suicide encouragement is an 
important issue that needs legislative attention, but the virtual-
presence theory is not an adequate solution because it is unconsti-
tutionally vague. Modern technology has expanded the reach of 
communication beyond the bounds of existing law; state legisla-
tures, therefore, should provide clear guidance about when suicide 
encouragement is criminal. This Article proceeds as follows: Part I 
provides factual background on the events that led to Roy’s suicide 
and Carter’s conviction. Part II argues that the trial court erred 
when it convicted Carter of involuntary manslaughter based upon 
a misreading of suicide encouragement cases, as well as a vague vir-
tual-presence theory. Part III employs a series of hypotheticals to 
illustrate how this virtual-presence theory is unworkable and en-
dangers individual liberty. And lastly, Part IV proposes that legisla-
tures—not courts—are best suited craft clear guidelines to govern 
suicide encouragement; legislative reforms in this area are con-
sistent with separation of powers principles that envisioned that
legislators, the people’s representatives, would decide when the law 
must deprive them of liberty. Two reforms are suggested. One in-
cludes a physical-presence requirement as a basis to prosecute 
someone who encourages suicide. The other uses well-known aid-
ing and abetting principles as a framework to prosecute suicide 
encouragement in the context of electronic communication.
I. BACKGROUND
Carter and Roy did not have a typical teenage romance. Accord-
ing to most reports, Carter and Roy met in 2012, when both teens 
45. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464–65.
46. Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Suicide Rate Surges to a 30-Year High, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/health/us-suicide-rate-surges-to-a-30-year-
high.html.
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were visiting relatives in Florida.47 Roy and Carter bonded over 
their struggles with mental health: Roy suffered from social anxiety 
disorder and depression, while Carter had an eating disorder and 
admitted she had cut herself in the past.48 They enjoyed an on-and-
off relationship between 2012 and 2014, rekindling it for the final 
time a month before Roy’s suicide.49 Carter and Roy lived thirty-five 
miles apart in Massachusetts, and their distance meant that the ma-
jority of their contact took place through the exchange of volumi-
nous text messages and cell phone calls.50
There are over four thousand text messages, but over the course 
of a few conversations, Carter underwent a metamorphosis in her 
attitude towards Roy and suicide.51 Carter began as a supportive 
girlfriend. On June 20, 2014, she texted an encouraging message 
to Roy:
Carter: You need to know that you are loved and wanted 
every second of every day not just by me, but by so many 
people.52
Roy: I f——d up my life but I did I feel like.53
Carter: Stop it no you didn’t. You’re just so tied up in your 
thoughts that you believe you did. You’re in a dark tunnel 
but it’s not gonna last forever. You’ll find the light someday 
and I’m gonna be here to help you find it. You didn’t
f——k up your life and you aren’t a f——k up. You’re just 
lost. But you’re gonna be found again I’ll never stop look-
ing. You’re gonna get thru this okay? I believe in you so 
much, I love you.54
Two days later, Roy contemplated suicide and Carter discouraged 
the idea:
47. Zavala, supra note 15, at 297; Mike Lawrence & Curt Brown, Police: Teen Coaxed 
Friend to Suicide, Sent Multiple Messages to Family, SOUTHCOAST TODAY (Feb. 27, 2015, 2:25 
PM), http://www.southcoasttoday.com/article/20150227/NEWS/150229466.
48. See Texts, supra note 16, nos. 7, 12 (alluding to Roy’s history of anxiety and depres-
sion); id. no. 64 (alluding to Carter’s eating disorder); id. no. 674 (alluding to her history of 
self-harm).
49. See Texts, supra note 16, nos. 1–92.
50. Zavala, supra note 15, at 298; Prosecutors Alleged Woman in Texting Suicide Case Was 
Looking for Attention, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 6, 2017, 2:00 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/prosecutors-woman-texting-suicide-case-wanted-
attention-article-1.3225955.
51. See Texts, supra note 16, no. 4274.
52. Id. no. 292.
53. Id. nos. 537–38.
54. Id. no. 538.
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Carter: Take your life?55
Roy: you think. I should56
Carter: You’re not gonna kill yourself. You say all the time 
you want to but look, you’re still here. All the times you 
wanted to you didn’t. You don’t wanna die, you just want 
the pain to stop.57
Roy: That’s true. I just don’t know what to do with myself.58
Despite Carter’s urging Roy to forget about suicide, Roy soon pro-
posed that he and Carter enter a suicide pact:
Roy: we should be like Romeo and Juliet at the end.59
Carter: Haha I’d love to be your Juliet ;)60
Roy: but do you know what happens at the end61
Carter: OH YEAH F——K NO! WE ARE NOT DYING62
Despite Carter’s initial support, their conversation took a dark turn 
a week later. On June 29, 2014, Roy emphatically texted Carter: “I
WANT TO DIE, if I have to be obvious.”63 When Carter concluded 
that he would not change his mind, she began to brainstorm ideas 
for how Roy can die and advised him to ignore his doubts:
Carter: What about hanging yourself or [stabbing] your-
self[?]64
Carter: What about over dosing on sleeping pills? Or [suf-
focation] with a plastic bag?65
Roy: am I really selfish . . . for wanting to kill myself so 
bad . . . and dragging you along with this.66
55. Id. no. 543. This exchange occurred on June 22, 2014.
56. Id. no. 544.
57. Id. nos. 545–46.
58. Id. nos. 547–48.
59. Id. no. 986.
60. Id. no. 987.
61. Id. no. 988.
62. Id. no. 989.
63. Id. no. 1358.
64. Id. no. 1377.
65. Id. no. 1382.
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Carter: No you’re not selfish don’t ever think that. People 
can say all they want that suicide is selfish, but that’s be-
cause they don’t understand the pain you’re going thru. 
And no don’t worry about me! I’m here for you forever to 
help you thru this as best I can and support you. You aren’t
dragging me along. I chose to [stay].67
Days before his suicide, Roy expressed hesitation:
Roy: Idk I’m just having really bad thoughts about it now. I 
wasn’t in an hour ago. but I can just picture my sisters cry-
ing and crying about me.68
Carter: Well. I would be devastated, shocked, and [ex-
tremely] upset for a week or 2. But as I said, I would have to 
find ways to cope. I would think about all the happy mo-
ments and the good times. I would remember all the beau-
tiful ways that she lived, not stay stuck and focused on how 
she died. It would be so hard at first, but with support from 
her friends and mine, and family, I would move on and get 
thru it, keeping her memory alive. They will cry for a while, 
but they know you just wanted to be happy and get rid of all 
the pain. They will cry about the good times and the bad 
that they shared with you. But it won’t hold them back. 
They will continue living their lives and maybe even live 
harder and stronger for you, because they know that’s what 
you would have wanted.69
Similar doubts resurfaced mere hours before Roy’s death, to which 
Carter responded: “I know you just have to do it like you said.”70 Af-
ter researching the effectiveness of various suicide methods, Carter 
eventually convinced Roy that his best bet was carbon monoxide 
poisoning.71
They decided that Roy would drive out to a parking lot and use a 
water pump to fill his truck with carbon monoxide until he even-
tually perished. Carter would remain on the phone with Roy 
throughout this process.72 According to the court, during the forty-
seven-minute phone call, Roy exited the vehicle because the car-
66. Id. nos. 1428, 1430–31.
67. Id. no. 1432.
68. Id. no. 1962.
69. Id. nos. 1963–64.
70. Id. no. 4183.
71. See id. no. 3035.
72. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1059 (Mass. 2016).
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bon monoxide was working, and he was afraid. It was at this point 
that Carter instructed Roy to reenter the vehicle, successfully com-
pleting his suicide attempt.73 Based on these facts, the state prose-
cuted Carter for involuntary manslaughter.
II. CARTER DID NOT COMMIT INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WHEN 
SHE ENCOURAGED SUICIDE THROUGH TEXTING
A. The State’s Case
Under Massachusetts common law, Carter was convicted of in-
voluntary manslaughter, defined as “an unlawful homicide unin-
tentionally caused by an act which constitutes such a disregard of 
probable harmful consequences to another as to amount to wan-
ton or reckless conduct.”74 The prosecution’s case rested on the 
theory that Carter’s failure to act constituted “wanton and reckless”
behavior. Wanton or reckless conduct may be established “by ei-
ther the commission of an intentional act or an ‘omission where 
there is a duty to act.’”75
In order to establish this, the law provides that “[a] defendant 
has a duty to act if (1) he or she has a special relationship to the 
victim or (2) he or she created a life-threatening condition.”76 The 
state argued that Carter in fact created a life-threatening condition 
for Roy by directing him to obtain the tools for and commit sui-
cide.77 Thus, Carter had a duty to take reasonable steps to try to 
stop Roy from killing himself, such as alerting his family or the au-
thorities.78 Much of the state’s evidence included the four-
thousand-plus text messages between Carter and Roy.
The juvenile court opinion explained the analytical basis for 
convicting Carter under an involuntary manslaughter theory. 
When analyzing that opinion, the court not only introduced the 
virtual-presence theory but implicitly developed a standard or test 
that identifies circumstances when a defendant’s virtual presence 
constitutes manslaughter. According to this standard, there are 
four conditions that establish criminal virtual presence when en-
couraging another to commit suicide.
73. Id. at 1063.
74. Commonwealth v. Godin, 371 N.E.2d 438, 442 (Mass. 1977) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).
75. Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 685 (Mass. 2012).
76. Zavala, supra note 15, at 304.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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First, the court found that the intimate nature of Carter and 
Roy’s relationship played a significant role in his suicide because 
the “particular circumstances of the defendant’s relationship with 
the victim may have caused her verbal communications with 
him . . . to carry more weight than mere words.”79 Second, her 
words, according to the court, had a “coercive quality” to persuade 
Roy. Third, Carter’s coercion led Roy to overcome the “doubts [he 
had] about killing himself.”80 Fourth, Carter should have known 
the gravity of this situation, considering their constant discussion 
about suicide and his “delicate mental state.”81 This framework pre-
sents void-for-vagueness issues even when applied to the Carter 
case.82
B. Physical Presence: A Limiting Principle in 
Suicide Encouragement Cases
Carter differs from two notable Massachusetts suicide encour-
agement cases: Commonwealth v. Atencio and Persampieri v. Common-
wealth.83 In Atencio, the court upheld an involuntary manslaughter 
conviction against a surviving member of a three-man group who 
played Russian roulette and one member killed himself. The game 
started when one defendant, found a revolver in the deceased’s
home and examined it to ensure that it had one bullet.84 He point-
ed the revolver “at his head, and pulled the trigger. Nothing hap-
pened. He handed the gun to Atencio, who repeated the process, 
again without result. Atencio passed the gun to the deceased, who 
spun it, put it to his head, and pulled the trigger: The cartridge
exploded, and he fell over dead.”85 The court found that the de-
fendant’s participation in the game fostered a dangerous environ-
ment “that created a high degree of likelihood that substantial 
harm [would] result to another,” thus constituting “wanton or 
reckless conduct.”86
Similarly, Persampieri affirmed the involuntary manslaughter 
conviction of a man who, when his wife threatened to commit sui-
cide, “said she was ‘chicken—and wouldn’t do it.’”87 He then had 
79. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1063 (Mass. 2016).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963); Persampieri v. Common-
wealth, 175 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961).
84. Atencio, N.E.2d at 224.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Persampieri, 175 N.E.2d at 389.
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his wife retrieve a .22-caliber rifle from the kitchen. He loaded it 
for her and noticed that the safety was off. She then fatally shot 
herself.88 In Atencio, the defendant was physically present, playing
Russian roulette with the deceased, and, in Persampieri, the defend-
ant was physically present with his wife, loading and giving her a
rifle.89 The glaring difference between Atencio, Parsampieri, and 
Carter is that the defendants in Atencio and Persampieri were physi-
cally present and made a physical contribution to the preparation 
of the killing instrument. Carter does not present the same situa-
tion—she neither purchased the generator used in the suicide, nor 
did she physically coerce Roy to get back in the truck.90 Carter’s
conviction for involuntary manslaughter is inconsistent with Mas-
sachusetts’s precedent. Virtual presence opened a new realm in su-
icide encouragement cases.
C. Virtual Presence: A New Principle in Suicide Encouragement Cases
In Carter, the court concluded that physical presence was not an 
essential element to the crime. Rather, it found that Carter’s
knowledge of Roy’s mental condition, along with their extensive 
communications through texting, gave Carter’s commands a “co-
ercive quality.”91 As a result, she convinced Roy to overcome his 
second-guessing about suicide.92 This dynamic, the court found, 
made Carter virtually present at the scene.93 This finding was based 
on the nature of their relationship. They did not have a traditional 
relationship with dinners at the local diner or evenings watching 
movies together on Netflix. Rather, it primarily existed in a virtual 
setting. Thus, the messages that encouraged, coached, and in-
structed Roy to commit suicide would have carried the same or 
similar weight as physically being there, advising him.94 In this con-
text, physical presence does not dictate wantonness or recklessness, 
but “[t]he circumstances of the situation dictate whether the con-
duct is or is not wanton or reckless.” The court said: “We need 
not—and indeed cannot—define where on the spectrum between 
speech and physical acts involuntary manslaughter must fall. In-
stead, the inquiry must be made on a case-by-case basis.”95 The 
88. Id.
89. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d at 224; Persampieri, 175 N.E.2d at 389.
90. Zavala, supra note 15, at 304–05.
91. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1063 (Mass. 2016).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1057 nn.3–4, 1063.
95. Id. at 1062–63.
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court acknowledged that there will be some subjective line drawing
from one virtual-presence case to another. This is the sort of arbi-
trary decision making the Due Process Clauses forbid.
D. Virtual Presence: The Slippery Slope
As a concept, virtual presence does not exist anywhere in Massa-
chusetts common law.96 While the world increasingly communi-
cates through electronic means, it appears that the law lags behind.
Carter breaks new ground.97 With online dating, virtual presence as 
a basis to convict an individual presents several questions. Does vir-
tual presence arise in the context of an online relationship or can 
it occur in less defined connections, such as casual chatting on a 
dating website? Or, can virtual presence arise between two people 
that have a platonic, not a romantic, friendship? Is it necessary for
the defendant to have knowledge that the defendant had a mental 
condition or is that an aggravating factor in the analysis? A possible 
response to these concerns is that there are no concrete answers to 
these questions because convictions would be decided on a case-by-
case basis. But the lack of concrete answers could place a defend-
ant’s constitutional right to fair notice in jeopardy.
The nebulous nature of online relationships makes crimes like 
Carter’s involuntary manslaughter almost boundless. An individual 
is virtually present whenever she texts, snapchats, or emails, each of 
which could make her subject to a criminal charge. Should Carter
reach all virtual relationships, no matter their length, intensity, or 
intimacy, then almost every suicide-by-encouragement would con-
stitute manslaughter. Carter’s logic does not make these distinc-
tions. Conceivably, a simple internet comment requesting that an-
other commit suicide that, in fact, leads to a suicide may constitute 
manslaughter. Virtual presence, therefore, confuses manslaughter 
law because no one knows which types of relationships or kinds of 
conduct could make someone guilty.98
96. Id. at 1063; see Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963); Persampi-
eri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961).
97. Katharine Q. Seelye, Michelle Carter Gets 15-Month Jail Term in Texting Suicide Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 3017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/us/texting-suicide-
sentence.html (“The outcome of the trial stunned legal experts, who said it broke ground by 
suggesting that words alone could be found to cause a suicide. Speech in this case was ruled 
to be as powerful as a loaded gun, a verdict with potentially broad implications.”).
98. Virtual presence is not the only problem with the conviction; the court’s focus on 
Carter’s relationship with Roy was irrelevant. The state did not opt to pursue the special re-
lationship theory. Zavala, supra note 15, at 304. Moreover, it is not clear if Carter and Roy’s 
connection can be defined as a “special relationship,” as a crime may not have been commit-
ted here. Under Massachusetts law, a person has a duty to report a crime as soon as possible. 
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III. THE CARTER MANSLAUGHTER TEST: VIRTUAL PRESENCE, DUE 
PROCESS, AND OTHER ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS
A. Virtual Presence is Void-for-Vagueness
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution demand that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”99 In Johnson v. 
United States, the Court held that vague statutes violate an individu-
al’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when government 
deprives liberty “under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give 
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so stand-
ardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”100 More recently, in
Sessions v. Dimaya, Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion powerfully 
explained the dangers of vague statutes to individual liberty:
Vague laws invite arbitrary power. . . . The founders cited 
the crown’s abuse of “pretended” crimes. . . as one of their 
reasons for revolution. Today’s vague laws may not be as in-
vidious, but they can invite the exercise of arbitrary power 
all the same—by leaving the people in the dark about what 
the law demands and allowing prosecutors and courts to 
make it up.101
To avoid this danger, criminal laws must state explicitly and def-
initely which conduct is punishable by law. Laws that violate this 
requirement are void-for-vagueness because they endanger indi-
vidual liberty by delegating authority to a judge or administrator 
that is so extensive that it can lead to arbitrary prosecutions.102 The 
void-for-vagueness doctrine thus advances two principles in safe-
guarding due process. One, it demands that citizens receive notice 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2018); id. ch. 269, § 18. But the court referred to Carter’s 
relationship with Roy as a basis for her conviction anyway: “Here, the particular circum-
stances of the defendant’s relationship with the victim may have caused her verbal commu-
nications with him in the last minutes of his life on July 12, 2014, to carry more weight than 
mere words, overcoming any independent will to live he might have had.” Carter, 52 N.E.3d 
at 1063. Thus, this reasoning fell outside the perimeter of manslaughter law. Massachusetts 
requires that a person report to law enforcement if they witness “an aggravated rape, rape, 
murder, manslaughter or armed robbery . . . .” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2018); see also
id. ch. 269, § 18 (setting forth a similar requirement for those who witness hazing). These 
circumstances were not present in this case.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015).
101. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223–24 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (in-
ternal citation omitted).
102. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
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as to what behavior is criminal. Two, it forbids the state from en-
forcing standards that are incapable of consistent application. Laws 
that violate either principle run contrary to the doctrine as shown 
in both early and modern cases. This Article will show below how 
the virtual-presence theory violates both the federal and state 
vagueness doctrines. 
1. Notice
Nineteenth century courts established the notice requirement 
for criminal statutes early in our republic’s history. For example, 
United States v. Sharp, decided in 1815, found that a criminal statute 
had to provide notice so citizens could organize their behavior to 
avoid penalty or incarceration.103 In that case, Justice Washington 
reversed convictions of several seamen charged under a statute 
that “made it a capital offence to make, or endeavor to make a re-
volt, or to confine the master.”104 Since Congress failed to de-
fine the phrase “to make revolt” in any way, the seamen could not 
know what specific conduct would arise to capital mutiny:
If we resort to definitions given by philologists, they are so 
multifarious, and so different . . . [that to select] from this 
mass of definitions, one . . . may fix a crime upon these 
men[,] . . . when, by making a different selection, it would 
be no crime at all. . . .105
Sharp explained that notice requires that “[l]aws which create 
crimes, ought to be so explicit in themselves, or by reference to 
some other standard, that all men, subject to their penalties, may 
know what acts it is their duty to avoid.”106 Therefore, criminal stat-
utes with words, phrases, or terms that are vulnerable to differing 
understandings violate this principle.
Notice continues to be a central focus in the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine; in fact, the Supreme Court established a standard to de-
fine what notice requires. According to one scholar, “when defin-
ing what constitutes notice in the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the 
Court has consistently over a period of at least a hundred years re-
ferred to common or ordinary men with common or ordinary in-
telligence, and has also historically and consistently referred to fair 
103. See United States v. Sharp, 27 F. Cas. 1041, 1043 (C.C.D. Pa. 1815) (No. 16,264).
104. Id. at 1042.
105. Id. at 1043.
106. Id.
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notice or fair warning.”107 Criminal statutes with broadly drafted 
terms that reach lawful activity fail this standard. Papachristou v. City 
of Jacksonville, for example, involved five consolidated cases where 
defendants were convicted under a local vagrancy code that crimi-
nalized, “prowling by auto,” “vagabonds” “loitering” and “common 
thief[s].”108 In one of the cases, two defendants were waiting for 
another friend “who was to lend them a car so they could apply for 
a job at a produce company.” 109 Unable to find their friend, they 
walked a two-block radius three times searching for him. At a store 
owner’s behest, police officers searched the two gentlemen; even 
though they found no weapons on them, they were charged as vag-
abonds.110
Paprachristou invalidated the vagrancy code because the ordi-
nance failed to provide a person with ordinary intelligence with 
notice because it “makes criminal activities which, by modern 
standards, are normally innocent.”111 In other words, it reached 
lawful activity. If the defendants’ “wandering and strolling” made 
them “vagabonds,” the Court reasoned, then the ordinance cap-
tured country club members who may stroll golf courses and, as 
another vagrancy ordinance prohibited, “habitually spend[] their 
time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold 
or served.”112 Therefore, statutes that reach lawful activity cannot 
provide notice because the ordinary person could not, in this case, 
discern between lawful wandering and unlawful wandering that 
constitutes vagabonding.
2. Arbitrariness
A related principle to the notice requirement is the arbitrary en-
forcement rule. That requirement demands that “a legislature es-
tablish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement” because 
when “the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a 
criminal statute may permit ‘a standardless sweep [that] allows po-
licemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilec-
tions.’”113 If an ordinary person does not know what a criminal law 
107. Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to The Void for Vague-
ness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 271 (2010).
108. 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972).
109. Id. at 159.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 163.
112. Id. at 164.
113. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 
566 (1974)).
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requires, then how could one expect an ordinary judge or police 
officer to know how to enforce it? The Court stressed this principle 
in the landmark Kolander v. Lawson decision.
There, the Court struck down a statute that required a suspect to 
provide “credible and reliable” identification to a police officer 
when they were stopped based on reasonable suspicion.114 Kolander
found that the statute as drafted granted “complete discretion” to 
police officers “to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the 
statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of 
probable cause to arrest.”115 Laws that give full discretion to law en-
forcement officials violate due process because they “entrust law-
making to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on 
his beat.”116 Without a standard to define “credible and reliable”
identification, police could arrest and prosecutors could charge 
citizens based on their own whims.117 Modern cases reaffirm the 
arbitrary enforcement requirement as a tenet of the vagueness 
doctrine.
Johnson v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya are two modern 
cases that illustrate the point. Both cases involved statutes with re-
sidual clauses that raised vagueness concerns. In Johnson, the Court 
struck down a provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act on 
vagueness grounds.118 That Act defined “violent felony” in part as 
an act that threatens the “use of physical force against the person 
of another;” “burglary, arson, or extortion;” “involves use of explo-
sives;” or “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another.”119 Johnson found that the last 
part, known as the residual clause, required judges to imagine the 
“kind of conduct that the crime involves in ‘the ordinary case,’ and 
to judge whether that abstraction presents a serious potential risk 
of physical injury.”120 The statute provided no standards or ele-
ments for the judge to determine what behavior constituted “a se-
rious potential risk.”121 With dismay, the Court posited the follow-
ing questions, “How does one go about deciding what kind of 
conduct the ordinary case of a crime involves? A statistical analysis 
of the state reporter? A survey? Expert evidence? Google? Gut in-
114. Id. at 352.
115. Id. at 358.
116. Id. at 360 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)).
117. Id. at 358.
118. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
119. Id. at 2555.
120. Id. at 2557.
121. Id. (quoting United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
SPRING 2019] The Innocent Villain 751
stinct?”122 The voluminous amount of information that could be 
used to define what conduct posed “a serious potential risk” invited 
arbitrary enforcement by judges.123
Sessions v. Dimaya involved an immigration law that made it an 
“aggravated felony” to be undocumented. Aggravated felony was 
defined, in part, as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by 
its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the 
person or property of another may be used in the course of com-
mitting the offense.” Like the residual clause in Johnson, the statute 
did not provide any predictability for how to measure what con-
duct posed a “serious potential risk” that could apply to an array of 
instances.124 Therefore, the clause violated due process rights.125
Similar to federal precedent, Massachusetts’s law demands no-
tice and prohibits arbitrariness as the lynchpins of its void-for-
vagueness doctrine. In Commonwealth v. Williams, for instance, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court struck down an anti-
sauntering and loitering ordinance for being void-for-vagueness on 
both notice and arbitrariness grounds.126 That ordinance com-
manded that “[n]o person shall saunter or loiter in a street in such 
a manner as to obstruct or endanger travelers or in a manner likely 
to cause a breach of the peace or incite to riot.”127 The court found
that the ordinance was facially vague because “[i]t [wa]s unclear 
what conduct a person may engage in before it rises to the level of 
obstructing a traveler.”128 Such a law granted police officers “unfet-
tered discretion that could result in arbitrary or discriminatory en-
forcement,” as law enforcement was not provided with a standard 
to distinguish lawful sauntering and loitering from conduct that 
arises to obstructing travelers.129
Another due process concern arose from arbitrary action in City 
of Fitchburg v. 707 Main Corp.130 There, the court struck down an or-
dinance that permitted the mayor to “impose conditions upon a 
license but said conditions may only relate to public safety, health 
or order.”131 The city successfully obtained a restraining order 
against the defendant for operating a movie theatre without a li-
cense; however, the defendant attempted to comply with the ordi-
122. Id. (internal citations omitted).
123. Id. at 2557.
124. Id. at 1213–17.
125. Id. at 1216.
126. Commonwealth v. Williams, 479 N.E.2d 687, 688 (Mass. 1985).
127. Id. at 687.
128. Id. at 689.
129. Id.
130. 343 N.E.2d 149 (Mass. 1976).
131. Id. at 153.
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nance, sending a letter to the mayor requesting an annual license 
with the fee enclosed.132 The mayor returned the fee with a copy of 
the ordinance instructing them to follow it.133
The court found that the ordinance was void-for-vagueness be-
cause there were no objective standards in the ordinance that lim-
ited the mayor’s discretion.134 Thus, the decision reflected “an arbi-
trary and capricious administration of the ordinance, and hence 
[produced] unfairness and discrimination which justifies the 
vagueness doctrine.”135 Here, the ordinance did not specify any 
procedures for the defendant to follow other than the mayor’s
specifications that could change from case to case.136 Like the fed-
eral cases, Massachusetts found that unrestrained official conduct 
violates the individual right to due process. Since Massachusetts 
law mirrors the federal void-for-vagueness doctrine, laws that fail to 
provide notice or permit discriminatory prosecutions offends both 
the state and federal constitutions. The virtual-presence theory, al-
so runs contrary to the doctrine.
B. Carter is Void-for-Vagueness
The virtual-presence theory violates both tenets of the vagueness 
doctrine. First, Carter did not receive fair notice that her conduct 
was punishable by law. The concept of “virtual presence” itself is 
oxymoronic, as the Oxford Dictionary defines “virtual” as “not 
physically existing but made by technology to appear so.”137 In oth-
er words, if someone is “virtual” by definition they cannot be pre-
sent. In addition, the standard explained above raises more ques-
tions than answers. For instance, what does it mean for the victim 
to be in a “delicate mental state?”138 Does a delicate mental state 
require a doctor’s diagnosis, or is erratic behavior or emotional 
volatility sufficient to constitute a delicate mental state? Such indef-
initeness makes virtual presence as unconstitutionally vague as the 
standardless “revolt” in Sharp, the sweeping “vagabond” in Papra-
christou, and the unpredictable residual clauses in Johnson and Di-
maya. Second, similar to the licensing ordinance in 707 Main Corp.,
virtual presence provides law enforcement with no definition of
132. Id. at 152.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 153–54.
135. Id. at 153.
136. Id.
137. Virtual, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/virtual (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
138. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1063 (Mass. 2016).
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the alleged offense committed, empowering officials with unfet-
tered discretion to decide when virtual presence permits criminal 
culpability and when it does not. This will result in arbitrary prose-
cutions. Assuming the standard provided a correct result in the 
Carter case, it does not follow that the framework is appropriate for 
similar cases. Subsection One will explain the test in detail, and 
then Subsection Two will provide hypotheticals to demonstrate 
that the virtual-presence theory is void-for-vagueness and may lead 
to arbitrary results.
In finding Carter guilty, the court established that “virtual pres-
ence” can constitute involuntary manslaughter when the following 
conditions are satisfied: (1) there is an intimate relationship be-
tween victim and defendant; (2) defendant has knowledge about 
victim’s “delicate” mental condition; (3) victim expresses doubt
about committing suicide; and (4) defendant persuades victim to 
overcome their doubt to commit suicide.139 We will refer to this as 
the “Carter test.” Two issues arise from this test: First, the court did 
not establish why any one of these factors are necessary to consti-
tute involuntary manslaughter. Second, even assuming that the 
court sufficiently proved each factor, the test fails to provide the 
public with fair notice as to what type of behavior could be punish-
able by law. Carter’s reasoning is overly broad and cannot consist-
ently provide a framework for virtual-presence cases. It is not clear
that the absence of any of these factors would lead to a substantive-
ly different outcome. Consider the following hypothetical and the 
three following scenarios, where one factor is missing, to highlight 
this point.
1. Quentin and Vicky Hypothetical
Quentin Ward is looking to meet local singles at his new law 
school, so he creates a profile on Reddit, and begins posting fre-
quently in the dating subreddit “R4R.”140 On the site, Quentin posts 
that he is a six-foot-one twenty-four-year-old law student with a 
swimmer’s build. He elaborates that he “loves music, working out, 
and writing poetry” and that he is “looking for fun, but ultimately 
wants to date.” He includes a picture of himself in the post. An 
anonymous user responds to his post, describing herself as a five-
foot-two twenty-year-old college student with a passion for “cook-
139. See id. at 1061–64.
140. See REDDIT: R/DATING, https://www.reddit.com/r/dating/ (last visited Jan. 31, 
2019). A subreddit is a forum on a social media network, Reddit, where members post links, 
images, and have discussions with each other online.
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ing, working out, reading, and going out with friends.” She ex-
plains that she is also looking to date. However, she did not in-
clude a picture of herself in the post. Curious, Quentin private 
messages the profile. Based upon the following circumstances, did 
the defendant commit involuntary manslaughter under Carter?
2. Hypothetical Scenarios
Scenario 1: An Intimate Relationship?
Quentin and the user exchange messages for a week. Quentin 
learns that the girl’s name is Vicky. She says that she will show 
Quentin what she looks like once she feels comfortable. During 
the week, they message frequently, revealing personal information 
about themselves. Both believe that they have the potential to have 
a relationship, as it is “easy to talk to” the other. She admits that 
she has had “bouts with depression but takes medication.” After six 
days, Vicky finally sends a picture of herself to Quentin. Shocked, 
Quentin responds, “You look nothing like how you describe your-
self. You totally catfished me! Bye. What a waste of time!” Vicky re-
sponds, “Please don’t. I really want you. If you go, I might hurt my-
self.” Quentin angrily responds: “If this is the type of lying you do 
on a regular basis, no wonder you don’t have a man. You should 
just kill yourself. Do mankind a favor.” Quentin blocks Vicky. That 
night, Vicky jumps off her apartment building to her death.
Analysis: Did Quentin Commit Involuntary Manslaughter?
Probably not. Although Quentin knew about Vicky’s “bouts with 
depression,” he did not have a relationship that was as intimate as 
Carter and Roy’s connection; their connection only lasted six days. 
That said, Quentin, like Carter, encouraged Vicky to commit sui-
cide when she said that she might harm herself. Nevertheless, their 
relationship did not involve persistent discussions about suicide 
that would have likely created circumstances in which Quentin’s
words would have had the same “coercive quality” as Carter’s
comments.
Measuring intimacy based upon duration of the relationship 
suggests that there may be different degrees of coercion. Any coer-
cive quality that Quentin’s instruction had was minimal. While 
Quentin and Vicky did see potential for a romantic relationship 
with one another, their six-day exchange did not mature into an 
“intimate relationship.” Though Quentin and Vicky’s relationship 
is distinguishable from Carter and Roy’s in many respects, the 
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Carter test does not provide any concrete guidance on what charac-
teristics qualify a relationship as “intimate.” The Carter test does not 
necessarily allow a prosecutor or judge to make this distinction.
The question is left to law enforcement to decide from case to case. 
Scenario 2: Delicate Mental State?
Vicky sends a picture of herself to Quentin, to which he replies, 
“Love at first sight.” The two exchange phone numbers. Over a 
week, they text and send Snapchats to each other. They agree to 
meet up for one date at a local restaurant and clearly have a ro-
mantic connection. Vicky leaves campus the following week to 
study abroad in Spain for the semester. They video chat on Face-
book every night, eventually telling one another “I love you.” After 
six weeks, Quentin tells Vicky that he “can’t wait to see her again”
and that “he misses her.” But Vicky soon becomes alarmed by her 
video chats with Quentin. Crying, Quentin tells Vicky, “I can’t live 
without you.” Since Vicky’s departure, Quentin has been suffering 
from depressive bouts because of his bipolar disorder, something 
he does not disclose to others, including Vicky. Over the next 
week, Quentin calls Vicky multiple times, messaging that he is hav-
ing “suicidal thoughts” because she is not responding to him. 
Alarmed, Vicky accepts his call. Quentin yells, demanding to know 
why she has not been responding.
Vicky: You’re making me uncomfortable. You’re too crazy. I 
didn’t sign up for this.
Quentin: I attempted suicide last night. I took a handful of 
Benadryl. But woke up. I might do it again.
Vicky: I don’t care. This is none of my business.
Quentin: I want to die. You want me to do it?
Vicky: Quentin, you just want attention. If you wanted to 
die you would’ve done something more dramatic like shoot 
yourself. Just be a man about it. 
Quentin: I can get a handgun. I’m gonna do it.
Vicky: Do what you have to do. Bye.
The video chat ends. The next day, Quentin dies from a self-
inflicted gunshot wound to the head.
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Analysis: Did Vicky Commit Involuntary Manslaughter?
Probably. This is a close question, as it turns on whether Vicky 
had knowledge of Quentin’s “delicate mental” state. Quentin never 
divulged that he was suffering from bipolar disorder. However, a 
prosecutor could assert that Vicky should have been able to con-
clude that Quentin was mentally disturbed after he admitted he 
was having suicidal thoughts and that he had attempted suicide the 
night before. She could argue that she relinquished any duty to 
Quentin when she said that the situation was none of her business.
Whether that would be a persuasive defense is unknown.
The Carter test is unclear about when potential defendants like 
Vicky have acquired sufficient knowledge about the victim’s mental 
infirmity to satisfy the knowledge element. If courts interpret this 
factor to require a “clear statement” of mental state, then Vicky did 
not have knowledge. But if a court applies the factor broadly, con-
ferring culpability if she “should have known” about Quentin’s
mental disorder, then she is likely guilty. Vicky will not know if she 
committed a crime until a foreperson announces her verdict.
Scenario 3: Reconsideration and Persuasion
Vicky sends a picture of herself to Quentin, and they exchange 
phone numbers. They text and send Snapchats to the other for a 
week. They never meet. During the summer, Quentin leaves cam-
pus and heads to California. Similarly, Vicky moves back in with 
her parents in Massachusetts. They FaceTime every night for three 
months, eventually telling one another “I love you.” They both re-
veal that they suffer from severe mental health issues. Vicky con-
fides in Quentin that she suffers from post-traumatic stress disor-
der due to being sexual assaulted in high school.
She feels that she will “never be normal or the same again.”
Quentin admits his anxiety and that his relationships with his fami-
ly make him feel “inadequate” and “worthless,” admitting he had 
unsuccessfully attempted suicide a year ago. One day, after a severe 
panic attack, Vicky texts Quentin, telling him: “I want to end it all.”
Vicky expresses that she cannot be talked out of it. She says that 
she is only telling Quentin because she loves him and wants him to 
be there when she does it. She asks Quentin’s advice on how to do 
it, to which he suggests taking a handful of Xanax and drinking a
bottle of wine. She agrees and asks him to video chat her while she 
does it. The final conversation goes as follows:
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Vicky: Okay, I’m ready.
Quentin: Are you sure you want to do this?
Vicky: Yes, babe. I can’t keep living like this. I’d rather die 
than have to wake up every morning knowing I may break 
down at any moment.
Quentin: Okay, my love, I won’t stop you.
Vicky takes the pills and begins drinking the wine. They talk for 
an hour.
Vicky: I’m feeling sleepy, babe.
Quentin: Let’s try to go to sleep then.
Vicky: Okay, I’ll see you on the other side. I love you.
Vicky and Quentin both fall asleep, Quentin wakes up the next 
morning to find Vicky passed out on the video chat, whispers “I
love you,” and ends the call.
Analysis: Did Quentin Commit Involuntary Manslaughter?
Applying the Carter framework, it is unclear if Quentin would be 
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The exchanges between 
Vicky and Quentin show that she neither reconsidered her deci-
sion and that Quentin did not persuade her to overcome any 
doubts. While these facts do not satisfy the final two Carter test 
conditions, this case is otherwise identical to Carter; thus, there is 
no rational reason why there should be a different outcome under 
the court’s reasoning.
First, Quentin knew about her “delicate mental” state, that is, 
Vicky’s post-traumatic stress disorder. Second, they had an “inti-
mate relationship,” frequently proclaiming their love for one an-
other over FaceTime. Like Carter, he offered her advice about how 
to commit suicide when he suggested that she take Xanax. Moreo-
ver, he agreed to be virtually present with Vicky through video chat 
during the suicide. His virtual presence established a duty to take
reasonable steps to prevent this tragedy. In Carter, the court found 
that defendant’s instruction to reenter the vehicle was “reckless,”
since “an ordinary normal [person] under the same circumstances 
would have realized the gravity of the danger,” and that to “the de-
fendant’s own knowledge, grave danger to others must have been 
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apparent and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk ra-
ther than alter [his or her] conduct so as to avoid the act or omis-
sion which caused the harm.”141 Similarly, an ordinary person in 
Quentin’s position would know to seek assistance. Like Carter, 
Quentin failed to do this.
The Carter test creates an anomaly in which close cases place de-
fendants squarely under the specter of culpability, whereas a de-
fendant in a case that is logically identical to Carter would likely be 
acquitted because there are two factors missing from the analysis. 
As a result, the test is too narrow because it does not always capture 
electronic encouragement of suicide. At the same time, the test is 
too broad, reaching situations where defendants have brief con-
nections with victims and little or no knowledge about their mental 
health.
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
Legislatures, not courts, are best suited to regulate this area ap-
propriately. Therefore, this Part recommends two reforms that 
should be implemented by legislatures. Section B recommends 
specific language that imposes a physical-presenence requirement 
for involuntary manslaughter laws, overruling Carter’s virtual-
presence theory. Then, Section C recommends that states adopt an 
aiding and abetting law for electronic encouragement of suicide 
that allows for the virtual-presence theory and imposes special rela-
tionship requirements to that creates a duty to report a person’s
intent to commit suicide to law enforcement or emergency medi-
cal services. Finally, Section D illustrates how that aiding and abet-
ting law would function, concluding that it would still find 
Michelle Carter guilty without upending the traditional physical-
presence requirement for involuntary manslaughter. 
A. Why Legislatures?
State legislators, not courts, should regulate this area for several 
reasons. First, whether an electronic encouragement of suicide 
constitutes a crime does not end the inquiry; rather, it introduces
others. For instance, how does a court identify whether a victim 
second guessed their decision? Does the second guessing have to 
be an explicit statement, or is it just hesitation? Can the second 
141. See Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1063 (citing Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672 
(Mass. 2012)).
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guessing happen prior to the suicide attempt, or must it happen 
during the event? These questions do not require either statutory 
interpretation or the application of case law. Instead, these ques-
tions are inherently policy-based in nature.
As the hypotheticals show, judicially crafted solutions are not 
suited to drawing lines between lawful behavior and criminal con-
duct in virtual-presence cases. This line drawing is further compli-
cated by the fact that suicide encouragement cases present com-
plex moral, philosophical, and constitutional issues, as well. For 
example, does the decision to commit suicide fall within the range 
of the “most intimate and personal choices” that are “central to 
personal dignity and autonomy” protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment?142 If so, how a person receives advice on the matter 
would be arguably free from government interference. Or, is this 
an area where government possesses countervailing interests, such 
as protecting the mentally or terminally ill, that outweigh an inter-
est in suicide? It is tempting, to avoid political controversy, to en-
trust a group of highly educated lawyers to make these choices for 
us. And why not? The judiciary shaped American criminal law dur-
ing the nation’s early years.
After the American Revolution, the states inherited their crimi-
nal law jurisprudence from England, and those American judges 
who “chose to accept or adapt a common law term to American 
circumstances often had to choose between [common law con-
cepts] or reject the term entirely.”143 But we do not live under the 
common law today; rather, criminal statutes enacted by legislatures 
govern because “[c]ommon law crimes, whether federal, state or 
local, have long been disfavored. They run afoul of our deepest no-
tions of due process and raise the specter of the judiciary imposing 
its will and the coercive powers of the state against its citizens.”144
The democratic process is the appropriate means by which we 
should identify criminal conduct because the people selected legis-
latures, not courthouses, as the forum where such decisions are 
made. Thus, criminal statutes possess a legitimacy that common 
law crimes do not. Statutes, unlike common law crimes, are scruti-
nized through open legislative deliberation and need public sup-
port to become law. Moreover, the legislative process can air out 
142. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint 
opinion). Distinguishing between intimate and non-intimate activities could be an arbitrary 
exercise, as well.
143. Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early American Re-
public, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461, 463 (2009).
144. Ben Rosenberg, The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 193, 
194 (2002).
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multiple perspectives and yield proposals that can enrich debate 
on controversies about crime and punishment.
So, in emerging areas, such as suicide encouragement cases, 
states should be permitted to serve as “laboratories of democracy”
in which legislatures can experiment with solutions to address 
these phenomena. Justice Brandeis warned his colleagues to not 
interfere with state level experimentation, because it denies the 
states the opportunity to consider the effects of measures designed 
to solve a common problem: “To stay experimentation in things 
social and economic is a grave responsibility. . . . It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try nov-
el . . . experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”145 I wrote 
elsewhere that this process offers practical benefits to policy formu-
lation, even if legislative programs produce negative, or unantici-
pated, outcomes:
Federalism cultivates experimental democracy in which dif-
ferent perspectives arising from a heterogeneous popula-
tion can be expressed through legislative action at the state 
level. . . . As these policies are implemented, the public as-
sesses the results: the legislation can serve as a model to 
emulate, a starting point for further innovation, or an ex-
ample of public policy failure.146
Legislative reform and experimentation in criminal law is con-
sistent with the void-for-vagueness doctrine; that doctrine reinforc-
es separation of powers principles by “prevent[ing] the legislative 
branch from delegating lawmaking power to the judiciary by pur-
posefully drafting statutes in vague terms in order to defer the re-
sponsibility of determining the specific conduct that should be 
classified as criminal to the judiciary.”147 In other words, the vague-
ness doctrine maintains political accountability. Should lawmakers 
enact an anti-encouragement statute, for instance, they must regu-
late the area with some level of specificity, which forces them to 
make tough policy choices, so voters can intelligently evaluate the 
program and decide to either reward or punish them at the ballot 
box.
145. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
146. Charles Adside, III, Constitutional Damage Control: Same-Sex Marriage, Smith’s Hybrid 
Rights Doctrine, and Protecting the Preacher Man After Obergefell, 27 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J.
145, 195 (2017).
147. Ava Miller, Note, How Vague is Too Vague?: Resurrecting the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine 
in the Context of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1164 (2016).
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Finally, judicial criminal lawmaking endangers individual liberty, 
opening a dragnet in which citizens can be arbitrarily swept up: “It 
would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large 
enough to catch all possible offenders,” the Supreme Court con-
cluded in United States v. Reese, “and leave it to the courts to step in-
side and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be 
set at large.”148 Ultimately, the democratic system is thwarted, be-
cause the public, via its representatives, that ratified the Due Pro-
cess Clauses is denied the right to decide the circumstances when 
its members liberties are deprived. Therefore, should legislators 
decide to criminalize suicide encouragement, they must enact laws 
that afford citizens fair notice of what circumstances can place 
them in the prosecutor’s crosshairs.
B. Legislatures Should Adopt a Physical-Presence Requirement
States may decide to abolish prosecutions where suicide results
from electronic communications and prevent its criminal justice 
system from adjudicating cases like Carter or the hypotheticals. 
Since a virtual-presence doctrine would be an unmanageable re-
gime for adjudicating encouragement cases, legislation imposing a 
physical-presence requirement would abrogate the theory in crim-
inal law. In addition to this rule, suicide encouragement statutes 
would benefit from aiding and abetting principles; these principals 
are preferable to new theories, such as virtual presence, because 
they do not force courts to develop standards or factors to decide
what constitutes a special or intimate relationship in the digital 
age. Courts are ill-suited to make judgement calls about the im-
portance of relationship duration or intimacy, particularly in cases 
involving video chats or online message boards. Such cases are 
novel and the results uncertain.
Legislatures, then, should amend involuntary manslaughter 
rules to impose a physical-presence requirement. 
Model Statute § 000.001
A person shall be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter 
when:
(a) he or she recklessly causes the death of another; 
and
(b) is physically present when they commit the reckless 
act that causes death.
148. 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876).
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C. Legislatures Should Adopt an Aiding and Abetting Statute for 
Electronic Suicide Encouragement 
Imposing a physical-presence requirement would exonerate 
Carter and others like her who use electronic communications to 
encourage suicide. After considered debate, legislators may con-
clude that electronic suicide encouragement is morally reprehen-
sible and deserves criminal sanction. The challenge, however, is to 
craft a policy that is clear and avoids vagueness issues. Again, aid-
ing and abetting principles provide an answer. After explaining the 
proper mental state for an electronic suicide encouragement aid-
ing and abetting statute, this Section introduces special relation-
ship laws to create a new model statute to apply in electronic en-
couragement of suicide cases. 
1. Mental State and Origins
Still, the public’s condemnation of Carter’s suicide encourage-
ment might indicate to legislatures that her conduct is worth crim-
inalizing. Rather than develop an incoherent involuntary man-
slaughter doctrine, as the Massachusetts trial court did, aiding and 
abetting laws are well-established, providing more predictable re-
sults than elusive theories like virtual presence. Familiar to both 
judges and prosecutors alike, aiding and abetting laws are among 
the most used in American criminal law as the doctrine applies to 
“all offenses and to all participants.”149 At common law, the doc-
trine has existed since the Fourteenth Century, depending on the 
theory that “the law of homicide is quite wide enough to com-
prise . . . those who have ‘procured, counselled, commanded or 
abetted’ the felony.”150 Similar to the common law, American fed-
eral law has included aiding and abetting statutes since 1790.151
President William Howard Taft signed the current federal statute 
into law in 1909.152 That statute provides that “[w]hoever directly 
commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law of the 
149. See, e.g., Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental State of the Aider and 
Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1346 (2002); James 
O’Connor, Note, Criminal Law—”But I Didn’t Know Who He Was!”: What Is the Required Mens 
Rea for an Aider and Abettor of a Felon in Possession of a Firearm?, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245, 
251 (2010) (“The aiding and abetting statute is among the most often used statutes in fed-
eral criminal law.”).
150. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (citations omitted); see also
Weiss, supra note 149, at 1344.
151. See Weiss, supra note 149, at 1344.
152. See id.
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United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or pro-
cures its commission is a principal.”153
The current jurisprudence on the mental state that an aider and 
abettor must possess originated with the storied Judge Learned 
Hand’s opinion in United States v. Peoni.154 In that case, Peoni sold 
counterfeit money to Regno who then sold those bills to Dorsey.155
Dorsey then attempted to pass on the money.156 The jury convicted 
Peoni for aiding and abetting Dorsey’s possession of counterfeit 
money because Peoni placed the money in circulation and knew 
that Regno would likely sell it to another guilty possessor such as 
Dorsey.157
Judge Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, reversed the convic-
tion.158 He found that the common law provided a lexicon that de-
fined the aiding and abetting doctrine. One became an accessory, 
for instance, if they “‘command, hire and counsel’ another to 
commit petit treason, murder, robbery or ‘willful’ arson.”159 Judge 
Hand pointed to other terms, such as “plotting, assenting, consent-
ing or encouraging.”160 He concluded that all these definitions had 
“nothing whatever to do with the probability that the forbidden re-
sult would follow upon the accessory’s conduct.”161 Thus, the de-
fendant must “participate in [a venture] . . . he wishes to bring 
about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed. All the words 
used—even the most colorless, ‘abet’—carry an implication of pur-
posive attitude towards it.”162 Peoni did not act with any purposeful 
intent because he did not agree with Regno to sell the bills to 
Dorsey.163 In fact, “Peoni had no concern with the bills after Regno 
paid for them.”164
Peoni requires that the defendant act with a purposeful intent, 
establishing a high threshold of culpability; it is not enough, there-
fore, to know or foresee the crime but rather the aider and abettor 
must act to bring about the success of the criminal enterprise.165
More specifically, the intent, or the ultimate goal, must be laid out 
153. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 350, § 332, 35 Stat. 1088, 1152 (codified as amend-
ed at 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2018)).
154. See Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402–03.
155. Id. at 401.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 401–02.
158. Id. at 403.
159. Id. at 402.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 403.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 402–03.
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clearly before the crime occurs.166 For instance, a gun trafficker 
who sells an M-16 rifle to a drug-dealer and knows it will be used in 
a murder is not culpable; however, he will be culpable if he wants
to sell the rifle so the drug dealer can kill a rival gang leader who 
refuses to purchase his merchandise.
The Supreme Court adopted the purposeful intent approach in 
Nye & Nissen v. United States. There, the Court affirmed the convic-
tion of a company president as an accessory in a widespread con-
spiracy to defraud the federal government by misrepresenting in-
voices for the purchase of dairy products during World War II.167
Citing to Peoni, the Nye court found that a conspirator must work 
with his or her co-conspirators in a way that makes the crime suc-
ceed.168 Such a theory, the Court reasoned, “is well engrained in 
the law.”169 In this case, there was adequate evidence that he pro-
moted the conspiracy, instructing his subordinates to make false 
invoices.
While the purposeful intent theory is “engrained” in doctrine, 
“[i]nterpretation of Hand’s test has varied and led to a number of 
schools of thought relative to the required [mental state] for aid-
ing and abetting.”170 Some courts still require a lesser state of mind 
for culpability,171 the knowledge standard, which stands in stark 
contrast to the purposeful intent approach.172 The knowledge 
standard simply requires that the aider and abettor’s participation 
in a crime that they know will occur.173 An inmate, for example, can 
be an aider and abettor if he or she gives a shiv to another inmate, 
knowing that it would be used in a jailhouse killing.174
There are other approaches, to be sure. One scholar counted as 
many as six different tests that courts use in this area.175 This Article 
does not take a position on any specific approach; legislatures, 
armed with their investigative powers, should experiment in this 
field to examine if a particular approach targets the kinds of cases 
that the public finds morally reprehensible or if a test reaches cases 
with unsuspecting accessories found in ambiguous circumstances.
That said, the purposeful intent approach does capture the narrow 
166. Id.
167. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 613–17 (1949).
168. Id. at 619.
169. Id. at 618.
170. O’Connor, supra note 149, at 253.
171. See id. at 253–55.
172. See Weiss, supra note 149, at 1366–67.
173. Id. at 1402.
174. See United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985), modified, 777 F.2d 345 
(7th Cir. 1985).
175. See generally Weiss, supra note 149, at 1373–76 (explaining the approaches courts use 
to identify the culpable mental state of an aider and abettor).
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class of cases where a defendant participates in another’s suicide 
plan with the desire to ensure its success. Under the knowledge 
approach, however, a person may be an accessory if they simply 
knew of the victim’s suicide plan and unknowingly aided the 
scheme but were indifferent about the outcome.
Consider the following hypothetical: On a suicide-help website, 
Matt chats with David for several hours and tells him that he is con-
templating suicide. David encourages Matt to take his anti-
depression medication and to seek help. Matt responds and says 
“Hey bro, you don’t understand I want to die. What should I do?”
David responds in frustration, “Man, I give up. Just cut your wrists 
or something. Leave me alone!” Matt cuts his wrists in his bathtub
and dies. Although David did not care if Matt committed suicide, 
he knew he was suicidal and should have foreseen that Matt was 
likely to take his suggestion to cut his wrists. So, David might be 
culpable under the knowledge test even though he does not have 
any desire to bring about Matt’s suicide. As this scenario shows, the 
knowledge approach may be too broad for suicide encouragement 
cases because it may not provide individuals with sufficient warning 
that their words or actions make them a participant in another’s
suicide mission. While the appropriate mental state is debatable, 
this Article contends that aiding and abetting is the best theory to 
pursue electronic encouragement of suicide cases.
Aiding and abetting rules are a perfect fit for prosecuting non-
present criminals, particularly in the “venue where the [criminal 
act] took place, which may well have been thousands of miles 
away.”176 While suicide is not criminal in the United States, aiding 
someone in such an effort establishes a substantive crime.177 This is 
no different from anti-doctor-assisted-suicide laws that criminalize 
assistance from a physician and not the suicide itself.178 These laws 
reach co-conspirators, such as a defendant who supplied a gun for 
a robbery while she stayed at her apartment or a mastermind who 
paid others to commit murder on his behalf.179 Similarly, these laws 
can reach persons who assist another in committing suicide 
176. Id. at 1370; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRM 2478, WHAT IS NOT AIDING AND 
ABETTING (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2478-what-not-
aiding-and-abetting (explaining that physical presence is not required to establish aiding 
and abetting).
177. See, e.g., Sean Sweeney, Note, Deadly Speech: Encouraging Suicide and Problematic Prose-
cutions, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 941, 945–48 (2017); Is Suicide Illegal? Suicide Laws by Country,
MENTAL HEALTH DAILY, (July 24, 2014), https://mentalhealthdaily.com/2014/07/24/is-
suicide-illegal-suicide-laws-by-country/ (“Currently there is no law against the act of commit-
ting suicide in the United States.”).
178. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.329a(1)(a)–(c) (2018).
179. Id.
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through electronic communication provided that the statutory el-
ements are satisfied.180
Aiding and abetting statutes offer an additional benefit, in that
they avoid First Amendment issues when prosecuting suicide en-
couragement cases. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for instance, 
struck down portions of a law that criminalized “intentionally advis-
ing, encouraging, or assisting in the taking of another’s own life.”181
The court held that the prohibitions against encouraging and ad-
vising another to commit suicide violated the First Amendment be-
cause they were not narrowly drawn.182 A statute based on the aid-
ing and abetting model, however, avoids this problem. Participat-
Participating and assisting are far more narrowly tailored than 
general advocacy.
2. Special Relationships and the Duty to Report
One way states can capture electronic encouragement of suicide 
is to enact a general “special relationship” statute that creates a du-
ty to report to authorities. About ten states have general “right to 
aid” or “right to rescue” statutes that bestow a duty upon any per-
son to report to law enforcement officials when they witness cer-
tain violent crimes.183 For example, Massachusetts confers a duty to 
report a crime to police “as soon as reasonably practicable” when-
ever someone “knows that another person is a victim of aggravated 
rape, rape, murder, manslaughter or armed robbery [or hazing] 
and is at the scene of said crime.”184 Other states impose broader 
duty to report rules. Instead of focusing on specific crimes, Wis-
consin requires that an individual at least “summon” police if they 
“know[] that a crime is being committed and that a victim is ex-
posed to bodily harm.”185 Drawing from these laws, states can craft 
narrowly focused laws that punish individuals that aid and abet 
others to commit suicide when they fail to report to law enforce-
ment or seek aid from medical personnel. Legislatures may con-
sider the below model statute:
180. Id.
181. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014).
182. Id. at 24–25.
183. See infra notes 188–89.
184. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2018); id. ch. 269, § 18. Other states have laws simi-
lar to the Massachusetts statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West 2018); FLA. STAT. § 
794.027 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-1-5.1, 
11-56-1 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.69.100(1) (2018).
185. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (2018); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (2018); MINN.
STAT. § 604A.01 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 2018).
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Model Statute § 000.002
Any person shall be found guilty of aiding and abetting sui-
cide through electronic encouragement if he or she:
(a) purposefully aids someone or solicits another to 
commit suicide through electronic communication;
(b) without obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from 
law enforcement or medical personnel; and 
(c) death results from the failure to obtain aid as re-
ferred to in subsection (a).
As opposed to the virtual-presence theory, Model Statute § 000.02 
provides clear answers in electronic communication cases.
Consider the application of the model statute to the hypotheticals. 
The Article will apply the general rule that the defendant must act 
with a purposeful intent or desire to bring about another’s
suicide.186
D. Better Than Virtual Presence: 
Model Statute § 000.02 and Clear Answers
Scenario 1
Quentin and Vicky engage in weeks of online messaging, before 
Quentin learns that Vicky had falsely described her appearance. 
They fight. Quentin ends the conversation by saying “You 
should just kill yourself. Do mankind a favor.”
Answer
Not Guilty. Under the model statute, courts need not consider the 
nature of this online relationship, or the potential “coercive” pow-
er Quentin might have had over Vicky. Instead, Quentin would 
clearly face no liability for his actions. For Quentin to be liable un-
der the statue, he must “assist or participate” in the suicide. 
Quentin’s vague statement that Vicky should kill herself does not 
rise to this level of assistance or participation. There was no 
agreement between the two that Quentin would assist her in com-
mitting suicide. Subsection (a) of § 000.002 is thus not triggered
because Quentin did not purposefully aid or solicit Vicky’s suicide.
Quentin is under no duty to obtain aid from law enforcement or 
medical personnel.
186. See Weiss, supra note 149, at 1375.
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Scenario 2
Quentin and Vicky begin a romantic relationship online and in 
person. After Vicky attempts to pull away in the relationship, 
Quentin tells Vicky that he struggles with bipolar disorder and 
has had suicidal thoughts. Quentin finally tells Vicky on the 
phone that he attempted suicide the night prior and that he 
might do it again if she hangs up. Quentin states that he has a 
handgun and intends shoot himself. Vicky ultimately says, “Do 
what you have to do. Bye.” Quentin commits suicide.
Answer
Not Guilty. Scenario 2 is a closer call than Scenario 1, but Model 
Statue § 000.02 still gives a clear answer. The fact pattern shows 
that, while Vicky does have knowledge about Quentin’s suicidal 
thoughts, she did not provide assistance and did not participate in 
the suicide. To the contrary, she attempts to leave the relationship 
and end the call; in fact, she says that his intention to commit sui-
cide is none of her business, revealing that she had no purposeful 
desire for him shoot himself. Thus, subsection (b) is not triggered, 
and Vicky is under no duty to report.
Scenario 3
After months of texting and video chats, Vicky tells Quentin that 
she wants to kill herself. Quentin offers advice on how to do it, 
specifically recommending that Vicky take a handful of Xanax and 
drink a bottle of wine. Vicky follows his advice. Quentin video chats 
with Vicky while she takes the pills, drinks the wine, and kills her-
self.
Answer
Guilty. Here, Quentin takes several steps that constitute participat-
ing in or aiding the suicide. Quentin purposefully acted to ensure 
that Vicky succeeded in her mission to commit suicide. Quentin 
suggested that she take the Xanax and drink the wine that Vicky 
ultimately uses to kill herself. At this point, the subsection (b) of 
the Model Statute § 000.02 is triggered. Quentin had a duty to ob-
tain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel. 
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Scenario 4: Commonwealth v. Carter
As the previous three scenarios demonstrate, the Model Statute 
provides a more workable rule that can be applied in electronic su-
icide encouragement cases. But how would it apply in Common-
wealth v. Carter?
Carter would be guilty under Model Statute § 000.002. Upon 
Roy’s insistence, Carter researched suicide methods and ultimately 
recommended a specific technique: carbon monoxide poisoning 
in a vehicle. This reflected an agreement between the two that 
Carter would aid and abet him in committing suicide. This level of 
specific instruction rises to participation and assistance, triggering 
subsection (b). Carter thus had an obligation to seek out law en-
forcement or medical personnel. Not only did Carter fail to notify, 
she coached and soothed Roy during the suicide, even encourag-
ing Roy to continue with the suicide attempt after he had fearfully 
left his truck. Carter’s level of specific intent, participation, and 
failure to notify anyone of Roy’s suicide attempt makes her clearly 
liable under the Model Statute.
V. CONCLUSION
Due process demands notice prior to conviction. Michelle 
Carter may be a villain, but Massachusetts denied her this guaran-
tee. Therefore, the SJC erred when it upheld her fifteen-month 
prison sentence. Understanding that many consider her conduct 
criminal, however, this Article proposes that future Carters can be 
warned based upon clear laws that include physical-presence re-
quirements or suicide aiding and abetting statutes.
One may argue that these reforms add to the national over-
criminalization problem, punishing defendants for crimes that 
never existed before.187 Suicide is no longer prohibited or penal-
ized in the United States.188 No one, arguably, should be convicted 
of aiding a crime that no longer exists. More broadly, maybe this 
subject should not concern the state at all. The decision to commit 
suicide “involv[es] the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime.”189 Put differently, whether a person 
should consider advice from another about their choice to live or 
187. See Reynolds, supra note 2.
188. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997).
189. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1460 (W.D. Wash. 1994) 
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint 
opinion)), rev’d, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702 (1997).
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die is their business. This Article does not take a position on that 
matter. Nor does it advocate that states should enact these pro-
posals. Rather it suggests that states that decide to criminalize sui-
cide encouragement should consider these issues to avoid vagueness 
difficulties.
For states that decide to criminalize suicide encouragement, 
these reforms offer societal benefits. They reinforce the democrat-
ic system, providing society with an opportunity to discuss spiritual, 
moral, and philosophical views on suicide. Society may enact laws 
to protect the vulnerable and mentally ill like Conrad Roy, because 
“[t]hose who attempt suicide . . . often suffer from depression or 
other mental disorders.”190 Potentially, these proposals can instruct 
future Carters to encourage someone contemplating suicide to 
seek professional help rather than to take their lives. Moreover, it 
can deter those with sinister motives, like an abusive caregiver or a 
money-grubbing heir, from aiding suicide for personal or financial 
gain.191 The central point is that whether or when suicide encour-
agement through electronic communication should be criminal is 
a question for society to decide. Answers to these policy questions 
should be developed democratically and not based on the subjec-
tive opinions of judges or prosecutors.
Ultimately, many will find Michelle Carter’s encouragement of 
Conrad Roy’s suicide morally repugnant and utterly deserving of 
criminal punishment. Though that may be the case, criminal pun-
ishment should not be imposed by an ad hoc judicial reinterpreta-
tion of longstanding doctrines of criminal law. If society wishes to 
criminalize this conduct, it should pass legislation to that end while 
preserving doctrinal integrity and affording fair notice. Our Con-
stitution recognizes that due process is a right shared by all, villains 
no less than the innocent.
190. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705–06; see MENTAL HEALTH DAILY, supra note 177 (“In 90% 
of cases, it was found that the person who ended up committing suicide did so as a result of 
untreated depression.”).
191. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732 (discussing that those contemplating suicide, particularly 
those with terminal illness, can be susceptible to coercion).
